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Appellant Cable One, Inc. ("Cable One"), by its attorneys, hereby submits its Reply Brief 
in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c). 
INTRODUCTION 
There is no basis in the law or the record of this case to justify the District Court's 
decision, and the Tax Commission fails to provide any legal or factual support for the District 
Court's conclusions. Cable One's cost of performance analysis was conducted in accordance 
with Idaho statutory and regulatory requirements and consistent with similar laws in other 
jurisdictions. The undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates that Cable One incurred more 
costs to provide Internet access services in 2005 due to activities outside of Idaho. As such, 
under well-established tax law principles in Idaho and other jurisdictions, income from the sale 
of those services is not subject to Idaho income tax. This Court should reverse the District 
Court's legal errors and set aside its erroneous factual findings. 
This Court also should fmd that alternative apportionment is not available here as a 
matter of law. There is no basis for the Tax Commission's proposal to apply the relief remedy of 
alternative apportionment, and the Tax Commission has not met its high burden to overcome the 
very strong presumption in favor of the normal three-factor allocation and apportionment 
method. Cable One's calculation of its income tax liability in accordance with Idaho law does 
not lead to the type of extreme, disproportional results that might justify alternative 
apportionment. Cable One's results are in accord with Idaho law and with the tax treatment of 
other similarly-situated Idaho taxpayers. The Tax Commission has failed to meet its burden of 
demonstrating otherwise. 
REDACTED COPY FOR PUBLIC RECORD 
ARGUMENT 
The weight of the evidence below demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of Cable 
One's costs to provide Internet access service were incurred outside ofIdaho, and that Cable One 
correctly excluded its Internet access service sales income from the Idaho sales factor numerator 
as required under I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2). The evidence also demonstrates that the Tax 
Commission has not met its high burden to apply an alternative allocation and apportionment to 
Cable One under I.C. § 63-3027(s). If the Tax Commission believes a change in Idaho tax law is 
necessary, its sole recourse is the legislature, as only that body can make law. Mead v. Arnell, 
117 Idaho 660, 664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1990); see also IDAHO CONS. art. III, §§ 1, 15; Berry v. 
Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177,369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1961) ("The wisdom, justice, policy, or 
expediency of a statute are questions for the legislature alone."). It is incumbent upon this Court 
to enforce Idaho tax statutes as written by giving effect to the intent of the legislature. Idaho 
State Tax Comm 'n v. Haener Bros., 121 Idaho 741, 743, 828 P.2d 304, 306 (1992); Bogner v. 
State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, State Tax Comm 'n, 107 Idaho 854, 856, 693 P.2d 1056, 
1058 (1984). But to the extent that there is any ambiguity in the statute or the Tax Commission's 
implementing rules, it must be resolved in Cable One's favor. See, e.g., Canty v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm 'n, 138 Idaho 178, 182, 59 P.3d 983, 987 (2002) ("Where an ambiguity is found in tax 
statutes, the statutes are generally 'strictly construed against the taxing authority and in favor of 
the taxpayer and ambiguities therein are to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer. "') (quoting 
Dep't of Employment v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 96 Idaho 386, 387, 529 P.2d 782, 783 (1974)); 
Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 420, 247 P.3d 644, 647 (2011) 
-2-
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("Administrative rules are interpreted the same way as statutes."). The District Court's decision 
is not supported by substantial and competent evidence and relies on "a strained and harsh 
interpretation o[ f] a series of statutes that otherwise have a plain, obvious, and rational meaning." 
J.R. Simp/at Co., v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 863-64, 820 P.2d 1206, 1220-21 
(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court's decision is both factually and 
legally incorrect, and must be reversed. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DEFINING CABLE ONE'S INCOME-
PRODUCING ACTIVITY 
Both parties agree that the first step in determining a taxpayer's income tax liability is to 
properly define the income-producing activity in question. Tax Commission Br. at 11; Cable 
One Br. at 13. The District Court erred when it determined that the income-producing activity in 
this case was Cable One's "attracting and servicing Idaho Internet access customers." (Conc. of 
Law 11, R. 000343 (emphasis added)). This fundamental error infects the whole of the District 
Court's analysis and is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The evidence 
below and applicable law make it clear that Cable One's income-producing activity is properly 
defined as the sale of Internet access service across its entire 19-state cable television broadband 
network. l 
During 2005, the tax year at issue in this case, Cable One's operations spanned 48 cable 
systems in 19 states. (Joint Stip. of Exhibits and Facts, R. 000279). Cable One's operations 
currently consist of 45 cable systems in 18 states. For consistency, Cable One refers herein to its 
operations as they existed in 2005. 
-3-
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A. The District Court Ignored the Plain Language of the Statute and the Rules 
for Defining Cable One's Income-Producing Activity 
Idaho law requires multistate corporations transacting business both within and without 
the state ofIdaho to engage in allocation and apportionment. I.C. § 63-3027(b). Cable One is a 
multistate business and its business income is taxable both inside and outside of Idaho. Cable 
One's income-producing activity or separate item of income at issue here - sales of Internet 
access service - is "performed both in and outside" of Idaho, which triggers the requirement that 
Cable One conduct a cost of performance analysis pursuant I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2). 
The District Court's definition of Cable One's income-producing activity does not 
comport with the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State 
Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1,5,855 P.2d 462, 466 (1993) ("Statutory interpretation always begins 
with an examination of the literal words of the statute. When construing a statute, we give the 
language contained in the statute its plain, obvious and rational meanings. Words and phrases of 
a statute are construed according to context.") (internal citations omitted). If Cable One's 
income-producing activity were limited to "attracting and servicing Idaho Internet access 
customers" as ruled by the District Court, there would be no need to engage in any analysis 
under I.C. § 63-3027(r). (Cone. of Law 11, R. 000343 (emphasis added)). When an "income-
producing activity is performed in [Idaho]," the sales automatically are considered to be in Idaho 
and no further analysis is necessary. I.e. § 63-3027(r)(1). By contrast, when an "income-
producing activity is performed both in and outside [Idaho]," a cost of performance analysis is 
required to determine whether the sales should be included in Idaho. I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2). Cable 
-4-
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One's multi state income-producing activity - the prOVISIOn of Internet access service - IS 
performed both inside and outside Idaho. Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 84, lines 20-23 ("We provide the 
internet access services in 48 systems in 19 states, yes."); see also Tax Commission Br. at 4 ("In 
2005, Cable One provided Internet access to customers in 19 states ... "); Joint Stip. of Exhibits 
and Facts ,-r 9, R. 000280 (noting that the Network Operations Center and Solution Center 
support the "provision ofInternet access service by all of Cable One's 48 cable systems located 
in the 19 states in which Cable One is authorized to operate"). 
The District Court's focus on "attracting and servicing Idaho Internet access customers" 
also conflicts with IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02, which instructs that "[t]he term income 
producing activity applies to each separate item of income and means the transactions and 
activity directly engaged in by the taxpayer in the regular course of its trade or business for the 
ultimate purpose of obtaining gains or profit." It is the taxpayer that determines its "separate 
item[ s] of income" based. on the taxpayer's specific "trade or business." IDAP A Rule 
35.01.01.550.02; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 212 Cal. App. 4th 78,95 (2012) 
(holding that "California permits the taxpayer to rely on its own accounting methods in 
determining its items of income"). In the regular course of its business, Cable One directly 
engages in transactions and activity to provide cable television services, Internet access services, 
advertising, and cable modem leasing for the ultimate purpose of obtaining gains or profit. Tr. 
Feb. 25/26, p. 40, lines 2-9; see also I.C. § 63-3027(a)(1) (defining "business income" as 
"income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of [Cable Oners trade or 
business"). As the evidence in this case demonstrates, the regular course of Cable One's 
-5-
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business does not include a separate income-producing activity of "attracting and servicing Idaho 
Internet access customers." Conc. of Law 11, R. 000343; see also Joint Stip. of Exhibits and 
Facts,-r 9, R. 000280 (noting Cable One's "provision of Internet access service by all of Cable 
One's 48 cable systems located in the 19 states in which Cable One is authorized to operate"). 
Cable One applied the plain language of IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 to identify its 
income-producing activity as the provision of Internet access service across 19 states. Cable One 
Br. at 16. This is the same approach taken by Cable One with respect to each of its other 
income-producing activities to which the Tax Commission has not objected. (Tr. Feb 25/26, p. 
85, lines 1-20). The key to determining the income-producing activity is to look at the "overall" 
activity engaged in by the taxpayer, which is consistent with the plain language of IDAP A Rule 
35.01.01.550.02. The rule "addresses what income-producing activity gave rise to a receipt" 
because the rule focuses on "transactions and activity having an ultimate purpose of obtaining 
gain. The focus is obviously broader than the last acts taken to realize gain. . .. [G]ain was 
produced by a combination of activities." Crystal Commc 'ns, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, State, TC 
4769,2010 WL 2827462, at *16 (Or. T.C. July 19,2010) (emphasis in original), affd sub nom. 
Crystal Commc'ns, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 353 Or. 300,297 P.3d 1256 (2013). The "overall" 
activity at issue here is the operation of Cable One's integrated multistate cable television 
broadband network from its headquarters in Arizona, which makes the provision of Internet 
access service possible in Idaho and in every other state in which Cable One operates. Tr. Feb. 
25126, p. 269, lines 13-24; cf Comm'r of Revenue v. AT&T Corp., 2012 WL 2865870, at *1-*2 
(Mass. App. Ct. July 13, 2012) ("AT&T Massachusetts Appear') (finding that it was AT&T's 
-6-
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"operation of its global network based in New Jersey that qualified as its income-producing 
activity" because AT&T "could not have provided the long-distance telephone calls to its 
customers without the integrated long-distance network based in New Jersey and other 
locations"); Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury, 403 N.W.2d 812, 820 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1986) (looking at "plaintiffs post-season revenues in 1976 through 1979, representing 
consideration for its overall operation of an NFL club"). 
The District Court also concluded that "[ a] literal reading of the IDAP A Rule 
35.01.01.550.02 definition of 'income producing activity' would require a transactional analysis 
of the cost of performance for Cable One receiving each Idaho customer's monthly payment for 
Internet access." (Conc. of Law 10, R. 000342).2 But the District Court found application of the 
"transactional" approach to Cable One would be burdensome and inappropriate. (Conc. of Law 
10, R. 000342). The Tax Commission similarly admits that using the "transactional" approach is 
not appropriate "given the facts of this case," but nonetheless argues that it should be the rule of 
law in Idaho for use in "a different factual circumstance." Tax Commission Br. at 12-13, nA.3 If 
The concept of a "transactional" approach to defining Cable One's income-producing 
activity was raised by the Tax Commission for the first time in response to Cable One's request 
for review of the Notice of Deficiency Determination from which this appeal originates. 
(R. 000251). 
The Tax Commission and its witnesses abandoned their arguments in favor of a 
"transactional" approach early on in this litigation. See, e.g., Starkey Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 36) 
-7-
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the District Court's decision is permitted to stand, all multistate corporations with business 
activity in Idaho will be forced to live with this erroneous interpretation ofIdaho law. 
The Tax Commission's support of the "transactional" approach incorrectly applies the 
plain language of IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 by focusing on only four words of the rule -
"separate item of income" which the Tax Commission asserts is "each of the monthly 
payments received from each of the Idaho Internet access customers in 2005." Tax Commission 
Br. at 12. The Tax Commission cannot pick and choose pieces of the legal framework without 
regard for the plain language of the statute or regulation as a whole. Clark v. Shari's Mgmt. 
Corp., 155 Idaho 576, 314 P.3d 631,635 (2013) ("This Court is required to 'give effectto all the 
words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. "') 
(citation omitted). There is nothing in Idaho law that requires Cable One to identify its income-
producing activity in the manner proposed by the Tax Commission. 
at p. 38, line 19 through p. 39, line 23 ("I don't think [Cable One is] required to do it on a 
customer-by-customer or a ... transaction-by-transaction basis"). The Tax Commission openly 
acknowledged that a transactional approach based on each Idaho customer would result in 
economic or administrative burdens. Fischer Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 33) at p. 33, lines 8-18 
(opining that direct costs should be identified "in an economically feasible manner," meaning 
"without an unreasonable amount of time" or "amount of expense associated with determining 
that cost"); Starkey 2nd Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 37) at p. 14, line 21 through p. 15, line 20 (noting 
that grouping transactions "may be administratively expedient"). 
-8-
REDACTED COPY FOR PUBLIC RECORD 
Cable One does not engage in "numerous income-producing activities ... to ensure that 
each of [its] Idaho customers would make each of their monthly payments for Internet access 
service throughout the 2005 taxable year." Tax Commission Br. at 13. Cable One engages in 
business activities and transactions that enable it to provide the income-producing activity of 
selling Internet access services "for the ultimate purpose of obtaining gains or profit." IDAPA 
Rule 35.01.01.550.02. The "activities" listed by the Tax Commission (activities at Cable One's 
Network Operations Center and Solution Center in Arizona, activities by Cable One employees 
in Idaho, activities/transactions with Qwest and AT&T, and activities constructing Cable One's 
network) are not the income-producing activity; they are inputs necessary to provide the income-
producing activity. Crystal Commc'ns, 2010 WL 2827462, at *16. For example, Cable One 
does not purchase Internet backbone services from Qwest and AT&T for the ultimate purpose of 
obtaining gains or profit; those services are necessary for Cable One to provide Internet access 
service to customers in all 48 systems in 19 states and are used to manage the cable television 
broadband network. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 278, lines 19-23; Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 274, lines 4-9). This 
is no different than Cable One's purchase of video programming in order to provide cable 
television services. (Tr. Feb 25/26, p. 74, lines 2-15 (explaining that one of Cable One's direct 
costs for cable television services is the purchase of programming such as ESPN)). Cable One's 
provision of cable television services to customers is the "income-producing activity," not the 
purchase of the programming needed to provide the cable television service. The Tax 
Commission's view of Cable One's income-producing activities does not comport with the plain 
language ofIDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02. 
-9-
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The Tax Commission's position also is inconsistent with the Tax Commission's 
acceptance of how Cable One applies I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2) and IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 for 
each of its other income-producing activities. The record demonstrates that Cable One 
conducted the same type of cost of performance analysis for its cable television and advertising 
services in 2005, both of which were performed inside and outside ofIdaho. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, pp. 
84-86).4 The Tax Commission has not questioned Cable One's application of Idaho law in 
relation to Cable One's sales of cable television service and advertising, or its leasing of cable 
modems. (Tr. Feb 25126, p. 85, lines 1-20). How Cable One defines its income-producing 
activity under I.e. § 63-3027(r)(2) and IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 appears to be unacceptable 
to the Tax Commission only when it results in the exclusion of revenue despite the fact that the 
plain language of the statute contemplates such a result. I.C. § 63-3027(c), (r)(2). 
The Tax Commission has recognized that the "income-producing activity test" found in 
I.e. § 63-3027(r)(2) "is one of the most troublesome aspects of the UDITPA statute" but while 
the test "is by no means perfect, it remains the test set out in the Idaho statute." Protest of 
[Redacted], Tax Commission Docket No. 17740, Decision at 3, 4 (Idaho State Tax Commission 
2005). The Tax Commission "has the duty to enforce the tax laws of this state as written" and 
"[ u ]nless and until the Idaho Legislature implements a new test, taxpayers providing services 
4 Cable One did not need to conduct a cost of performance analysis for its income-
producing activity of cable modem leasing because that activity was performed only in Idaho. 
Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 86, lines 1-12; see also IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.05.b. 
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within this state must comply with the current test." Id. The District Court erred in its 
conclusion that identification of the income-producing activity under IDAP A Rule 
35.01.01.550.02 requires "a transactional analysis," and the Tax Commission has provided no 
support for that conclusion. 
B. Case Law from Other Jurisdictions Demonstrates Cable One Defined Its 
Income-Producing Activity in the Manner Intended by the Idaho Statute and 
the Tax Commission's Implementing Regulations 
Case law from other states further supports Cable One's application of the plain language 
ofI.C. § 63-3027(r) and IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02 to define its income-producing activity as 
the provision of Internet access service in 19 states. Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 
148 Idaho 391, 396, 224 P.3d 458, 463 (2008) ("When confronted with matters of first 
impression involving Idaho statutes, this Court may glean insight from the interpretations of 
sister states concerning similar or identical statutes."). Consistent with Cable One's approach 
here, Massachusetts defines a taxpayer's income-producing activity based on the "overall 
activity" or the "totality of activities" undertaken by the taxpayer. AT&T Corp. v. Comm'r of 
Revenue, 2011 WL 2243933 at *2 (Mass. App. Tx. Bd. June 8, 2011) ("AT&T Massachusetts 
Board Decision") (finding AT&T "engaged in numerous activities ... both within and without 
Massachusetts that were necessary to the overall activity of operating and managing the 
network"); Boston Prof Hockey Ass 'n v. Comm'r of Revenue, 2003 WL 21499974, at *11 
(Mass. App. Tx. Bd. June 30, 2003) ("Boston Prof Hockey Board Decision") (finding it was 
"the totality of activities" that "constituted activities whose performance created an obligation in 
the ultimate customers to pay consideration"), ajJ'd by Boston Prof Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. 
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Comm'r of Revenue, 820 N.E.2d 792, 799 (Mass. 2005) (professional hockey team's income-
producing activity was "many subsidiary activities (including the playing of games) necessary to 
create a viable NHL franchise"). The "activity that gives rise to [the] sales income is [the 
taxpayer's] overall operation of a business." Interface Group v. Comm'r of Revenue, 2008 WL 
4642961, at *9 (Mass. App. Tx. Bd. Oct. 17,2008). Massachusetts specifically rejected the Tax 
Commission's "transactional" approach by finding, for example in the AT&T Massachusetts 
case, that "each long-distance call" did not constitute the income-producing activity because 
"customers were actually paying for a reliable system of telecommunications, and that it was the 
operation of [the] global network based in New Jersey that qualified as [the] income-producing 
activity." AT&T Massachusetts Appeal at *1. 
The Tax Commission tries to distinguish the Massachusetts line of cases by arguing that 
the Massachusetts regulation defining "income-producing activity" has "significant differences" 
from the Idaho definition, and that "appears" to have been the determining factor for the 
Massachusetts courts' findings. Tax Commission Br. at 15.5 There is no merit to the Tax 
The Tax Commission claims Cable One advocated in its brief for an "operational" 
approach for identifying the income-producing activity (Tax Commission Br. at 12), but there is 
no discussion of "operational" in Cable One's Opening Brief. Rather, Cable One asserted that 
the income-producing activity at issue in this case is the provision of Internet access services in 
19 states, which is consistent with Cable One's own accounting practices, Idaho law, and the law 
of other states. Cable One Br. at 15-16. 
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Commission's claim. The Massachusetts regulation uses the phrase "transaction, procedure, or 
operation" while the Idaho regulation uses "transactions and activity." Compare 830 Mass. 
Code Regs. 63.38.1 with IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.02. With the inclusion of "activity" and 
"operation," both regulations use language to suggest that a taxpayer look beyond a single event 
or transaction to the taxpayer's total activities or operations. "Activity" and "operation" have 
similar meanings, the Massachusetts courts use the terms interchangeably, and there is nothing to 
suggest the Massachusetts regulation means something fundamentally different because it uses 
the word "operation" rather than "activity." AT&T Massachusetts Board Decision at *10 
(looking at "overall activity" to find "AT&T's income-producing activity was its operation of its 
global network"); Boston Prof Hockey Board Decision at *5, *11 (looking at "the totality of 
activities" to determine the "income-producing activity was the ownership and operation of an 
NHL franchise"). 
The Massachusetts line of cases is consistent with several similar cases from Michigan, 
which the Tax Commission neglects to address at all. See, e.g., Detroit Lions, Inc., 403 N.W.2d 
at 820-21 ("In defining the term 'business activity,' M.C.L. § 208.3(2) refers specifically to the 
activity of the taxpayer, and thus we agree that the proper focus is not on whether the Lions 
themselves played in post-season games, but on the activity which gave rise to their entitlement 
to post-season revenue. This revenue was earned through the plaintiffs membership in the NFL 
and its performance of duties which arise from that membership, such as taking part in football 
games, both home and away.") (emphasis in original); Michiana Metronet, Inc. v. Michigan 
Dep't of Treasury, 2011 WL 3890444, at *5 (Mich. Tax Trib. Aug. 11,2011) (fmding that the 
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"business activity" at issue is "providing an integrated wireless communications network that 
allows for the routing and completion of wireless communication transmissions including voice 
calls, text messages, data, and other associated services") ("Michiana Tribunal Decision"), air d 
by Michiana Metronet, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury, 2012 WL 5854453, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 
8, 2012). The cost of performance statute in Michigan uses the term "business activity" instead 
of "income-producing activity," and defmes "business activity" based on the "activity of the 
taxpayer" similar to the Idaho regulation. Compare Mich. Compo Laws § 208.3(2) (defming 
"business activity") with IDAP A 35.01.01.550.02. The Michigan decisions view income-
producing activity in the same way as the Massachusetts courts despite the fact that the Michigan 
definition of "business activity" contains no reference to the word "operation.,,6 These cases 
6 
"Business activity" is defined as: "a transfer of legal or equitable title to or rental of 
property, whether real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or the performance of services, 
or a combination thereof, made or engaged in, or caused to be made or engaged in, within this 
state, whether in intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce, with the object of gain, benefit, or 
advantage, whether direct or indirect, to the taxpayer or to others, but shall not include the 
services rendered by an employee to his employer, services as a director of a corporation, or a 
casual transaction. Although an activity of a taxpayer may be incidental to another or other of 
his business activities, each activity shall be considered to be business engaged in within the 
meaning of this act." Mich. Compo Laws § 208.3(2). 
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provide further support for defining Cable One's income-producing activity as the provision of 
Internet access service in 19 states. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION FAILED TO PROPERLY ANALYZE 
CABLE ONE'S DIRECT COSTS OF PROVIDING INTERNET ACCESS 
SERVICE 
Once the income-producing activity is defined, both parties agree that the second step in 
an analysis under I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2) is to "[i]dentify the direct costs of performing the income-
producing activity." Tax Commission Br. at 11; see also Cable One Br. at 13 (stating the second 
step is "identification of the costs of performance of that income-producing activity using a 
direct costs analysis"). As the Tax Commission previously has observed, "[u]nder Idaho law, the 
focus of the 'income-producing activity' inquiry is on the direct costs associated with the 
generation of the income in the taxpayer's regular course of business. Indirect costs relating to 
the generation of the income, such as compensation paid to officers and directors and other 
general and administrative costs, are not considered." Protest of [Redacted], Tax Commission 
Docket No. 17740, Decision at 5 (Idaho State Tax Commission 2005). The issue of "what are 
the direct costs" was a key "factual question" before the Court in this case. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 
52, lines 18-22). 
Cable One looked to its profit and loss statements to determine the direct costs for 
producing its Internet access service income. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 88, lines 19-23). IDAP A Rule 
35.01.01.550.03 states that direct costs are to be determined "according to generally accepted 
accounting principles and accepted conditions or practices of the taxpayer's trade or business." 
Consistent with the requirements of the rule, Cable One's profit and loss statements were 
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prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles and also were "prepared 
according to the accepted conditions or practices of Cable One's business." (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 
44, lines 2-23). Cable One's profit and loss statements provide an "objective standard or set of 
standards for determining direct costs" as they are generated as part of "a financial accounting or 
externally focused process" and thus can be viewed as "a generally accepted accounting 
principle or industry wide practice." AT&T Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2012 WL 119850, at *6 
(Or. T.e. Jan. 12,2012) ("AT&T Oregon"); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 212 
Cal. App. 4th 78, 95 (20 12) (citing to California's "costs of performance" definition in rmding 
that "California permits the taxpayer to rely on its own accounting methods in determining its 
items of income"). 7 
7 The Tax Commission takes issue with Cable One's reliance on the Microsoft case for the 
proposition that a taxpayer may rely on its own accounting methods in determining its direct 
costs. Tax Commission Br. at 20-21. Cable One understands that identifying "items of income" 
(i.e., income-producing activities) is a separate step from identifying "costs of performance" (i.e., 
direct costs). See, e.g., Cable One Br. at 13. While the Microsoft court may have referenced 
"items of income," its intent is clear as reflected by its citation to the California rule defining 
"costs of performance." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18, § 25136(c) (2005) ("The term 'costs of 
performance' means direct costs determined in a manner consistent with generally accepted 
accounting principles and in accordance with accepted conditions or practices in the trade or 
business of the taxpayer."). California's definition of "costs of performance" is nearly identical 
-16-
REDACTED COpy FOR PUBLIC RECORD 
IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.03 requITes that only "direct costs" be considered when 
determining costs of performance. The District Court failed to engage in any legal or factual 
analysis to distinguish between direct and indirect costs associated with Cable One's Internet 
access service. The District Court was not excused from conducting this analysis because the 
parties stipulated to certain of Cable One's direct costs associated with its Internet access service. 
Cj Tax Commission Br. at 19. The District Court was required to determine whether the costs 
were direct or indirect for any Cable One costs that were not stipulated to by the parties before 
including such costs in the costs of performance of Cable One's Internet access service. Cable 
One Br. at 20-21; see also IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.03. 
Instead, without substantial and competent evidence, the District Court found that "direct 
costs include the costs incurred by Cable One in providing internet services to its Idaho 
customers." (Conc. of Law 9, R. 000342). This conclusion ignores the law requiring costs of 
performance to focus on direct costs only and is tantamount to interpreting "direct costs" to 
"swallow so many costs that 'direct costs' becomes virtually synonymous with 'all costs. '" 
AT&T Oregon at *6; see also IDAPA Rule 35.01.01.550.03 ("Costs of performance are the 
direct costs .... "). Direct costs cannot mean the same as the costs "incurred to engage in the 
general business activity." AT&T Oregon at *6; see also Illuminating Co. v. Burns, 2014 WL 
585254, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13,2014) (finding that direct costs for purposes of calculating 
damages "are the expenses incurred as a result of the actual project and include materials, labor, 
to the one contained in Idaho's regUlations. IDAPA 35.01.01.550.03. 
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mileage, and equipment costs" while indirect costs "are the expenses involved in running a 
business and are not attributable to anyone project") (citations omitted). 
The District Court's error was compounded further by its conclusion that "[a ]llocated 
capitol [sic] improvement costs" should be included as a direct cost in Cable One's cost of 
performance analysis. (Conc. of Law 13, R. 000343). There is no legal or factual support for 
including capital costs or depreciation associated with Cable One's cable television broadband 
network as "direct costs" of providing Internet access service.8 None of those costs were 
incurred specifically to provide Internet access service, and Cable One would have incurred 
those costs if Cable One did not offer Internet access service. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 200, lines 17-
23; Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 201, lines 11-19). Cable One excluded capital costs and depreciation from 
its cost of performance analysis because those costs were not incurred only "because the revenue 
producing transaction or activity in question occurred." AT&T Oregon at *5; see also Feb. 
25/26, p. 108, lines 21-25, p. 109, lines 1-25. Based on "generally accepted accounting 
principles and accepted conditions or practices" of Cable One's business and as directed by the 
applicable IDAPA rule, Cable One excluded capital costs and depreciation associated with its 
The District Court's decision to utilize Cable One's 2005 qualified Broadband Tax Credit 
as a proxy for capitalized costs and depreciation also is not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence, and is unprecedented. (Conc. of Law 12, R. 000343). Idaho's Broadband 
Tax Credit regime is irrelevant to the questions posed here. I.C. § 63-30291; see also Cable One 
Br. at 22-23. 
-18-
REDACTED COPY FOR PUBLIC RECORD 
cable television broadband network from its costs of performance of its Internet access service 
because they are not "direct costs" of that service. The District Court's conclusion is contrary to 
law and the record evidence, and if upheld, would affect all multistate corporations operating in 
Idaho. 
The Tax Commission recognizes the inclusion or exclusion of capital costs and 
depreciation as direct costs is "inconsequential" to Cable One's cost of performance analysis, but 
nonetheless argues for their inclusion. Tax Commission Br. at 19. The Tax Commission offers 
no legal or factual basis for treating capital costs or depreciation as direct costs. The Tax 
Commission's own witness explained that costs relating to equipment and facilities not 
specifically installed and utilized exclusively for Internet access service do not constitute direct 
costs. See, e.g., Fischer Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 33) at p.42, line 10 through p. 43, line 24. The 
Tax Commission also agreed that depreciation is not always considered a direct cost, and that 
Cable One would still incur depreciation even if Cable One did not offer Internet access service. 
See, e.g., Fischer Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 33) at p. 52, lines 18-25; p. 53, lines 1-16; Starkey 2nd 
Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 37) at p. 66, line 22 through p. 68, line 21. Tax Commission witness 
Starkey took this same position in the AT&T Oregon case. See, e.g., AT&T Oregon at *5 
(adopting the testimony of the expert witnesses in the case, including Tax Commission witness 
Starkey, "that direct costs are those that are only incurred because the revenue producing 
transaction or activity in question occurred"). There is no basis for including capital costs or 
depreciation as direct costs because the substantial evidence in this case demonstrates that the 
"assets in place and the depreciation on those would be incurred regardless of whether" the 
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income-producing activity (Internet access service) was offered to customers or not. AT&T 
Oregon at n.7; Hannan Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 26) at p. 18, lines 5-23, p. 21, line 19 through p. 
22, line 24; see also Starkey 2nd Dep. Tr. (Trial Exhibit 37) at p. 60, lines 10-18. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE LOCATION 
OF CABLE ONE'S DIRECT COSTS 
A. The Internet Backbone Services Are Arizona Costs Based on the Totality of 
Cable One's Activities to Provide Internet Access Service in 19 States 
The Qwest and AT&T Internet backbone service costs are properly sourced to Arizona 
because they are costs associated with the operation of Cable One's entire cable television 
broadband network, which is centrally managed from Arizona. Cf AT&T Massachusetts Board 
Decision at *10 ("Simply put, AT&T could not provide its long-distance service without 
operating its entire long-distance network."). Cable One realizes income from its provision of 
Internet access service only by virtue of its cable systems' connection to Arizona and Cable 
One's cable television broadband network as a whole. Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 269, lines 13-24 
(explaining how Cable One could not offer service without a connection to Arizona); see also 
Detroit Lions, 403 N.W.2d at 820-21 (finding football team earned revenue "through the 
plaintiff s membership in the NFL and its performance of duties which arise from that 
membership," and thus costs were measured not on the basis of each game, but on plaintiffs 
overall operation as an NFL club). This is similar to the Michiana case, in which a wireless 
carrier had "network assets" in both Indiana and Michigan, and those network assets were 
necessary for the carrier to provide service. Applying costs of performance, the majority of the 
carrier's costs were determined to be in Indiana because it was where "the infrastructure that 
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provided services such as internet access, e-mail delivery, billing, text messaging, and other 
services" was located. Michiana Tribunal Decision at *4. In reviewing the taxpayer's costs of 
performance determination, the Michigan courts looked at the entire "integrated wireless 
communication network" used by the carrier because the "entire wireless network, located in 
both Indiana and Michigan, was necessary for Petitioner to provide its services." Michiana 
Tribunal Decision at *5. Cable One cannot provide Internet access service in any location 
without access to its infrastructure in Arizona, which includes its Solution Center, Network 
Operations Center, provisioning module, LDAP module, SNMP module, DHCP module, TFTP 
module, DNS Module, billing module, and customer email module. (Findings of Fact 15, R. 
000336-38; see also Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 266 line 23 through p. 267, line 6). Cable One connects 
its entire cable television broadband network to Arizona using the Qwest and AT&T backbone 
services; the backbone services are a necessary component of the overall operation that is needed 
to provide Internet access service. General Mills, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 795 N.E.2d 552, 
570 (Mass. 2003) (finding "that it was the business operations (including billing and customer 
relations) and management ofTalbots" that was the income-producing activity). 
Cable One's Arizona headquarters are essential to its Internet access service and cannot 
be ignored. Cf AT&T Massachusetts Board Decision at *11 ("Just as it has recognized the 
importance of a taxpayer's Massachusetts headquarters, the Board here must equally recognize 
the importance of AT&T's centralized network hub, which was located outside of 
Massachusetts."); see also AT&T Massachusetts Appeal at *2 (stressing "the importance of the 
activities that took place at the headquarters of the company"). The District Court recognized 
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that "the personnel, staff, servers, equipment and software that support the operations of [Cable 
One's] cable systems" were "[l]ocated at Cable One's Phoenix, Arizona headquarters," and that 
those Arizona operations "support the internet services provided by Cable One through its 48 
cable systems." (Finding of Fact 6, R. 000333). Similarly, Cable One employees located in 
Arizona negotiate, centrally manage, and oversee the purchase, implementation, billing, and 
payment relating to the backbone services contracts. See, e.g., Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 270, lines 3-16; 
p. 273, lines 16-23; p. 281, lines 4-13; p. 280, lines 4-13; p. 282, lines 9-11; see also Aff. of 
Bradley D. Ottley ~~ 13-15, R. 000163-64.9 The importance of the activities taking place at 
Cable One's Arizona headquarters to the overall operation of Cable One's cable television 
broadband network and its Internet access service cannot be overlooked. Boston Prof Hockey 
Board Decision at *3 (fmding activities performed in Massachusetts because general manager 
maintained an office in Massachusetts and "negotiated contracts" from that office); Boston Prof 
Hockey, 820 N.E.2d at 799, 800-01 (affirming importance of where "activities" took place, 
including where the NHL franchise was "administered and managed"); AT&T Massachusetts 
Board Decision at *11 ("[W]hile AT&T engaged in numerous subsidiary activities, both within 
and outside Massachusetts, that were an essential part of its income-producing activity, it 
provided ample evidence establishing the importance of the activities performed at its Global 
Network Operations Center, where employees operated and managed a network capable of 
routing and re-routing each transmission in order to ensure its successful completion."). There is 
no Internet access service (income-producing activity) to Cable One customers anywhere 
9 Mr. Ottley's Affidavit was also used as Trial Exhibit 31. 
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without the connection between the cable systems in the 19 states and the Cable One Arizona 
headquarters. This connection is only possible by virtue of Cable One's agreements with Qwest 
and AT&T for interstate communications services. 
B. The Internet Backbone Services Are Arizona Costs Based on Record 
Evidence and Legal Precedent 
The District Court's decision that the costs related to the Internet backbone services 
Cable One purchases from Qwest and AT&T were incurred by Cable One in Idaho is contrary to 
substantial and competent record evidence and well-established law. (Findings of Fact 14(f), 25, 
R. 000336, 339). The importance of the Internet backbone services to Cable One's overall 
operation of its cable television broadband network from its Arizona headquarters is not at issue. 
(Findings of Fact 6, 15, R. 000333, 336 (listing the "Internet Backbone" as part of "Cable One's 
Arizona Back Office" and explaining "Located at Cable One's Phoenix, Arizona headquarters 
are the personnel, staff, servers, equipment and software that support the operations of its 48 
cable systems. Within the headquarters is the' Arizona back office' that consists of the Solution 
Center and Network Operations Center personnel, the router, servers and related equipment and 
software that support the internet services provided by Cable One through its 48 cable 
systems")). Yet both the District Court and the Tax Commission erroneously characterize the 
costs of the Internet backbone services as "Idaho" costs rather than costs incurred by Cable One 
in Arizona. There is no support for this position. The evidence of this case and applicable law 
demonstrate that Cable One properly categorized its Internet backbone costs for the Qwest and 
AT&T services as costs incurred in Arizona. 
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First, the services provided by Qwest and AT&T do not "involve two distinct services." 
(Finding of Fact 14{f), R. 000336; Tax Commission Br. at 25-26). The contracts for services do 
not permit Cable One to purchase a "local service connection" from Qwest or AT&T as a 
separate service as Cable One's witness explained: "It clearly states on page one of the contract, 
local access may only be purchased if also purchasing at least one of the following: Voice and 
data, DIA, dedicated internet access, dedicated IP transit and/or private routed network services. 
In our case DIA." (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 274, lines 4-9; p. 277, lines 22-25; p. 276, lines 1-6). All 
of those services are interstate long distance services. {Tr. Feb 27, p. 57, line 22 through p. 58, 
line 12 ("What it does tell me is that the FCC considers this service to be an interstate service. 
There is no way around that. And it does that because there is this whole other body of law of 
the FCC about Internet service and high-speed data service services. . . . the FCC . . . took 
primary jurisdiction of traffic that travels to the Internet under the notion that you can't tell 
where it's going to go, whether it's going to cross state boundaries or anything else.")). Both 
carrier contracts state that the local access service may only be purchased in connection with the 
customer's use of the carrier's long distance network services or IP services for which a local 
connection is required. See, e.g., Qwest Agreement, Local Access Service Exhibit (Trial Exhibit 
28) at 10 (section 4.1) ("Customer may purchase the Service only in connection with Customer's 
use of Qwest Interexchange carrier services or IP services on the Qwest Domestic Network for 
which a local loop is required."); Qwest Agreement (Trial Exhibit 28) at 1,2 {stating the services 
are available in all states in which Qwest operates and noting that local access service may be 
purchased only if Cable One also purchases at least one other interstate service, which includes 
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dedicated Internet access service); AT&T Agreement, Global Addendum to Master Agreement 
(Trial Exhibit 29) (stating that services are to be delivered in the United States); AT&T 
Agreement, AT&T Managed Internet Service Addendum (Trial Exhibit 29) at 1, ,-r 5 (stating that 
the prices are "solely for Internet port bandwidth" and do not include local access charges that 
may be associated with the service). The Qwest and AT&T agreements provide an interstate 
communication service made available by combining several Qwest and AT&T products, 
including a local access element. The local access element is a small part of the overall long 
distance service ultimately sold to Cable One, which allows Cable One to connect its cable 
systems in 19 states to its Arizona headquarters and the Arizona headquarters to connect the 
customers of those 48 cable systems to the Internet. Aff. of Bradley D. Ottley,-r 10, R. 000162; 
see also Nat 'I Cable & Telecomms. Ass 'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 990 (2005) 
("It is common usage to describe what a company 'offers' to a consumer as what the consumer 
perceives to be the integrated finished product, even to the exclusion of discrete components that 
compose the product."). 
Second, Qwest and AT&T are not providing Cable One with "a dedicated high-speed 
network connection to the Internet." Tax Commission Br. at 26. Cable One is "purchasing 
backbone services to obtain bandwidth to be able to communicate in Idaho with the router that's 
in Idaho across the Qwest or AT&T network to the route[r] in Cable One in Phoenix." (Tr. Feb. 
25126, p. 304, lines 18-22). Each of the headends in Cable One's cable television broadband 
network has one or more dedicated Internet access ports (with different bandwidth levels 
depending on the port), and each of those ports connects to similar dedicated Internet access 
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ports at Cable One's Arizona headquarters. (Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 324, lines 2-25; p. 325, lines 1-
16). The Qwest and AT&T services are end-to-end services. Cable One has "created a tunnel or 
a virtual private line between the [Cable One] router in Idaho to Cable One Phoenix" and uses 
"the Qwest or AT&T network to facilitate that transmission from the Idaho router to the Cable 
One Phoenix router." (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 310, lines 17-25). The service provided by Qwest and 
AT&T is a "dedicated" service, which is a point-to-point service in which Cable One detennines 
the end points as Tax Commission witness Starkey admitted: "Mr. Ottley [Cable One's witness] 
described it correctly as a tunnel. .. Cable One would set that up between its two routers, this 
router at the headend, and then its router in Arizona and use its management system to define 
that virtual private network between those two facilities." (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 99, lines 1-2, 17-21). 
The Tax Commission's witness specifically rejected the notion that the traffic is ')ust being 
thrown out on the Internet [to] let it find its way any way it wants to get there" based on the 
understanding that Cable One was "defm[ing] a certain route, if you will, a logical route, that the 
traffic will take between two points." (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 99, lines 3-5, 13-15). The routing, as 
defined by Cable One using the Internet backbone services, ensures a repeated and continuous 
interface with Cable One's Arizona headquarters in order for Cable One's customers to use the 
Internet access service. (Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 266, line 23 through p. 267, line 6). 
Third, Qwest and AT&T do not provide services to Cable One by "physically providing 
and maintaining in Idaho the 'Idaho backbone services' for each Idaho cable system" or to Cable 
One "at Cable One's Idaho headend facilities." (Finding of Fact 25, R. 000339; Tax 
Commission Br. at 27). The backbone services purchased from QwestlAT&T would be useless 
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if those services were not connected to Cable One's Arizona headquarters. (Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 
278, lines 3-14). A service always has both an origination and tennination point. This concept is 
reflected on a typical phone bill, which provides the charges for the entire end-to-end phone call 
(Boise to San Francisco), and the originating and terminating points of the call. The charge to 
the customer for a call is based on the complete end-to-end service, not one charge for the Idaho 
end of the call and a separate charge for the San Francisco end of the call. Cable One's purchase 
of backbone services from Qwest and AT&T works in the same way. The Tax Commission's 
focus on only the Idaho portion of the backbone services (Tax Commission Br. at 26-27) ignores 
the reality of the backbone service being purchased by Cable One - an end-to-end service 
between each of Cable One's 48 headends and Cable One's Arizona headquarters. Teleconnect 
Co. v. The Bell Tel. Co. of Penn., et al., 10 F.C.C.R. 1626,,-r 12 (1995) (focusing on "the end-to-
end nature" of a service or "the nature of the communications" rather than "the facilities used to 
complete such communications") (citing Nat 'I Ass 'n of Regulatory Uti!. Comm'rs v. FCC, 746 
F.2d 1492, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (subsequent history omitted). 
Fourth, the facilities used and the path chosen by Qwest and AT&T does not change the 
fact that Cable One purchases and utilizes the Internet backbone services for all of its 48 cable 
systems throughout 19 states. Cf Tax Commission Br. at 23-24; see also GTE Telephone 
Operating Cos. GTOC Tariff No. 1 GTOC Transmittal No. 1148, 13 F.C.C.R. 22466,,-r 19 (1998) 
(finding the "fact that the facilities and apparatus used for [a] service offering may be located 
within a single state does not affect [the] jurisdiction" of the service), recon. denied, 17 F.C.C.R. 
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27409 (1999).10 The record evidence demonstrates that the Qwest and AT&T contracts cover the 
provision of services to all Cable One systems in its multistate service territory under a single 
contract with each carrier. (Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 274, lines 4-9; p. 277, lines 22-25; p. 278, lines 1-
6). The contracts are multiyear agreements with discounts, revenue commitments, and shortfall 
liabilities applied based on Cable One's total purchase of services for connection with all Cable 
One systems under a single carrier agreement. (Tr. Feb 25/26, pp. 275-76). The contracts are 
negotiated, managed, and services are paid for by the Arizona headquarters. See, e.g., Tr. Feb. 
25126, p. 270, lines 3-16; p. 273, lines 16-23; p. 281, lines 4-13; p. 282, lines 9-11; see also Aff. 
of Bradley D. Ottley,-r,-r 13-15, R. 000163-64. There is no question that activities occurring at 
Cable One's Arizona headquarters, including the purchase of the Internet backbone services, 
"support the internet services provided by Cable One through its 48 cable systems." (Finding of 
Fact 6, R. 000333). 
Finally, the Qwest and AT&T services cannot be divorced from their legal and regulatory 
treatment. The Internet backbone services provided by Qwest and AT&T are interstate services. 
Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 274, lines 10-20 (explaining that the backbone services traverse state lines as 
10 This is because "the path taken by the electronic signals is often indirect and typically 
bears no relation to state boundaries. The number of possible paths, the nature of the electronic 
signals, and the system of computerized switching make it virtually impossible to trace and 
record the actual paths taken by the electronic signals." Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 255 
(1989). 
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they pennit "communication from the router in Idaho to the router in Phoenix by way of the 
Qwest or AT&T network"); see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(28) (defining "interstate communication" 
or "interstate transmission"); 47 C.F.R. § 36.154( a) (stating that if greater than 10% of the traffic 
across a circuit is interstate, all of the traffic is classified as interstate). Qwest and AT&T 
consider the backbone services Cable One purchases to be interstate services. See Aff. of 
Bradley D. Ottley ~ 17, R. 000165; see also Qwest Agreement (Trial Exhibit 28) at 10 (requiring 
Qwest's service to be used for interstate purposes). Even the Tax Commission admits that the 
backbone services are interstate services. (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 57, lines 22-24). The Idaho portion of 
the backbone services is only "an intrastate strand of an interstate service." In re Frontline 
Communications Corp., 2006 WL 776281, at *10 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Mar. 16,2006). While 
there may be intrastate components as part of an overall interstate service offered by an entity, 
that service should be characterized "by reference to the nature of the data traffic carried over the 
provided lines and the destination of those communications." In re Fastnet Corporation, 2006 
WL 776280, at *13 (N.Y. Tax App. Trib. Mar. 16, 2006); see also Nat 'I Ass'n of Regulatory 
Uti!. Comm'rs, 746 F.2d at 1498 (finding the jurisdiction of a service "depends on 'the nature of 
the communications which pass through the facilities [and not on] the physical location of the 
lines''') (quoting California v. FCC, 567 F.2d 84,86 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Focusing on the physical 
location of equipment owned by another company from which Cable One purchases services 
"ignore[s] altogether the actual uses" of the Internet backbone services. Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. 
Co., 282 U.S. 133, 150-51 (1930); see also Moran Towing and Transp. Co. v. New York State 
Tax Comm'n, 72 N.Y.2d 166,171 (1988) ("The focus is on what the actor does, not where he 
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does it."). 
To source the costs relating to the Internet backbone services to Idaho because Qwest and 
AT&T utilize facilities that may have physical intermediate points in Idaho ignores the reality of 
the services purchased by Cable One and the purpose for which they are purchased. The 
backbone services are used to connect each of Cable One's 48 cable systems to Arizona and to 
each other, are an integral component to Cable One's provision of services to customers 
(including Internet access service), are purchased pursuant to a single contract with each carrier 
that covers all of the states in which Cable One operates, and are negotiated and managed from 
Arizona. The backbone services are a necessary component of Cable One's overall operation of 
its nationwide cable television broadband network, which is centrally managed from Arizona. 
The costs associated with the Internet backbone services should be treated as Arizona costs based 
on the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., AT&T Massachusetts Board Decision at *11; 
AT&T Massachusetts Appeal at *1-*2; Detroit Lions, 403 N.W.2d at 820-21; Michiana Tribunal 
Decision at *4-*5. 
IV. FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION AND 
APPORTIONMENT ARE NOT APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 
A. The District Court Erred in Its Reliance on the "Fairly Represents" 
Standard to Review Cable One's Compliance with the Standard Allocation 
and Apportionment under § 63-3027(r) 
The District Court correctly concluded that this case involves "calculation of the sales 
factor" under I.e. § 63-3027(r)(2) and the Commission's implementing rules, and thus it would 
be ''unnecessary and improper" to make any findings regarding "an alternate allocation and 
apportionment under I.C. § 63-3027(s)." (Cone. of Law 5, 6, 21, R. 000342, 345). The District 
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Court's conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's determination that there is "a very 
strong presumption in favor of the normal three-factor apportionment and against the 
applicability of' alternative allocation and apportionment. Union Pacific Corp. v. Idaho State 
Tax Comm 'n, 139 Idaho 572, 576, 83 P.3d 116, 120 (2004); see also Container Corp. of Am. v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983) (finding the statutory three-factor formula "has 
become ... something of a benchmark against which other apportionment formulas are judged"). 
The District Court, however, is not permitted to make determinations regarding Cable 
One's compliance with I.e. § 63-3027(r)(2) based on "fairness." Section 63-3027(r)(2) makes 
no reference to what might "fairly represent" the extent of a taxpayer's business in Idaho, and 
courts must implement the law as written. See, e.g., Idaho State Tax Comm 'n v. Haener Bros., 
121 Idaho 741, 743,828 P.2d 304,306 (1992); Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, 
State Tax Comm 'n, 107 Idaho 854, 856,693 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1984); see also Hayden Lake Fire 
Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,312, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005) ("Where a statute is 
unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and courts are free to apply the plain 
meaning."). 
Despite this, the District Court determined that excluding Cable One's Internet access 
service revenues from the calculation of its Idaho sales factor did "not fairly represent the extent 
of Cable One's 2005 business activity in Idaho." (Cone. of Law 19, R. 000344).1l The normal 
II Section 63-3027(s) does establish a "fairly represents" standard for reviewing whether 
alternative allocation and apportionment may be applied when the standard allocation and 
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three-factor apportionment standard under I.C. § 63-3027(r) for reporting multi state corporation 
income does not hinge on whether the exclusion or inclusion of the revenue will produce a result 
that "fairly represents" the taxpayer's business activity in the state. The sole consideration for 
determining inclusion or exclusion of revenue under I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2) is whether "a greater 
proportion of the income-producing activity is performed in [Idaho] than in any other state, 
based on costs of performance." I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2). The Tax Commission itself admits that 
the "fairly represents" standard is found only in I.C. § 63-3027(s) governing alternative 
allocation and apportionment. Tax Commission Br. at 29. The District Court's reliance on the 
"fairly represents" standard to conclude that Cable One improperly excluded its Internet access 
service sales is contrary to the plain language of the statute and constitutes an error of law. I.C. § 
63-3027(r)(2); see also Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 124 Idaho 1, 5, 855 
P.2d 462,466 (1993) ("Statutory interpretation always begins with an examination of the literal 
words of the statute."); Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 576, 83 P.3d at 120 ("There is a very strong 
presumption in favor of the normal three-factor apportionment and against the applicability of 
the relief provisions."). 
apportionment provisions of I.C. § 63-3027(r) do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's 
business in this state. See generally Union Pacific. The District Court, however, correctly 
concluded that alternative allocation under I.e. § 63-3027(s) would be improper in this case. 
(Conc. of Law 19, R. 000344). Thus, the "fairly represents" standard has no application. 
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B. The Tax Commission Has Not Met Its Burden to Apply Alternative 
Allocation and Apportionment to Cable One 
The Tax Commission completely fails to address the very strong presumption in favor of 
the use of the standard allocation and apportionment formula and against alternative allocation 
and apportionment. The Tax Commission's brief is replete with references to the ***START 
CONFIDENTIAL*** _ ***END CONFIDENTIAL*** of sales revenue at issue in 
this case as evidence that an alternative allocation and apportionment should be applied to Cable 
One. See, e.g., Tax Commission Br. at 29, 30, 31, 35, 37. The amount of sales Cable One 
generates is not a permissible reason to deviate from the strong presumption in favor of the 
standard three-factor apportionment formula. Any consideration of alternative allocation and 
apportionment must be based on Cable One's overall allocation and apportionment because 
"[ d]istortion in one factor. . . does not necessarily result in unfair reflection of the business 
activity in the state." Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 577, 83 P.3d at 121 ("It is necessary to 
establish that the application of the three factors does not fairly represent business activity, not 
merely that one factor fails to meet this standard.") (emphasis added); Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 700 P.2d 1035, 1043 (Or. 1985) (the "department must show not 
just that one factor fails to meet this standard, but the entire formula taken together does not 
fairly reflect taxpayer's business activity"). 
This fundamental flaw in the Tax Commission's analysis cannot be understated. Under 
the Supreme Court's controlling Union Pacific precedent, the Tax Commission "must show that 
the three-part formula does not accurately reflect the taxpayer's business in the State." Union 
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Pacific, 139 Idaho at 575, 83 P.3d at 119; see also Twentieth Century-Fox, 700 P.2d at 1042 
("department must demonstrate that the statutory formula as a whole does not 'fairly represent 
the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this state"') (internal quotations omitted). 
"Merely because the use of an alternative form of computation produces a higher business 
activity attributable to [the state], is not in and of itself a sufficient reason from deviating from 
the formula." Washington Federal, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 2008 WL 4600356 (Idaho 
Dist. July 28, 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also US Bancorp v. 
Dep't o/Revenue, 19 Or. Tax 266,310-11 (Or. T.C. 2007) (dismissing Department of Revenue's 
claim that it may "require an adjustment whenever it decides that the adjustment would render 
the taxpayer's return more fair and accurate" as "completely unsupported" since "[c]ourts have 
long recognized that apportionment is not an exact science; kicking the ball through the uprights 
is all that is needed, not a shot through a bulls-eye"). The Tax Commission must "establish[] 
that statutory apportionment does not adequately reflect business activity, not merely that it does 
not adequately reflect income earned in the state." Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 577,83 P.3d 121 
(emphasis added); see also Twentieth Century-Fox, 700 P.2d at 1042 (sarne).12 
12 Cable One's 2005 income tax return is not "an inaccurate reflection" of Cable One's sales 
in Idaho because Cable One failed to apply costs of performance in the years between 2001 and 
2004. Cf Tax Commission Br. at 36 (citing Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 578, 83 P.3d at 122). 
Determining the proper tax treatment of Cable One's sales under Idaho law for tax year 2005, 
including the applicability of alternative apportionment, does not depend on Cable One's 
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The Tax Commission has made no such showing here. The Tax Commission fails to 
mention the ***START CONFIDENTIAL*** _ ***END CONFIDENTIAL*** 
in sales revenue that was included in Cable One's sales factor numerator (and is not at issue 
here),13 or the existence of the undisputed payroll and property factors. (Joint Stip. of Exhibits 
and Facts ~ 17, R. 000282). When viewed in totality as required under Union Pacific, over 
***START CONFIDENTIAL***. ***END CONFIDENTIAL*** of Cable One's 2005 
total income tax obligation to the State of Idaho is undisputed by the parties. The Tax 
Commission's focus on such a small portion of Cable One's overall income tax liability does not 
begin to justify application of an alternative allocation and apportionment method here. Union 
Pacific, 139 Idaho at 578, 83 P.3d at 122 ("What must be shown is sufficient distortion that 
[taxpayer's] business activity in the state is not fairly reflected; simply advocating a better 
method than the standard formula is unavailing") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Exclusion of Cable One's Internet access service revenue in the Idaho sales factor numerator 
does not create a "sufficient distortion" from Cable One's tax return as filed to warrant deviation 
from the "very strong presumption in favor of the normal three-factor apportionment." Union 
Pacific, 139 Idaho at 576,83 P.3d at 120; see also Container Corp of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 
historical income tax practices. Cable One Br. at n.7. 
13 Cable One included the revenues from its cable television services, advertising services, 
and cable modem leasing in the Idaho sales factor numerator of its Idaho income tax return for 
2005. (Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 84, line 24 through p. 86, line 12). 
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463 U.S. 159, 184 (1983) (fmding a difference of 14% between the standard statutory fonnula 
and the alternative method did not provide sufficient distortion to pose a constitutional problem); 
AT&T Teleholdings, Inc. v. Dep 't of Revenue, 978 N.E.2d 371, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (rejecting 
alternative apportionment where difference in percentages was 26%); BellSouth Adver. & Pub. 
Corp. v. Chumley, 308 S.W.3d 350, 365 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding alternative 
apportionment where the distortion was close to 97%); Tesoro Corp. v. State of Alaska Dept. of 
Revenue, 312 P.3d 830, 847 (Alaska 2013) ("As we have stated in the past, [i]nherent in the use 
of fonnula apportionment is the legislative decision that a certain degree of distortion will be 
tolerated.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Tax Commission tries to support its alternative allocation and apportionment request 
by proffering testimony from its expert witness Mr. Peters regarding the "desire" for the sales 
factor to "represent the market state." Tax Commission Br. at 34.14 Mr. Peters' opinion, 
however, is the exact type of analysis discredited by Union Pacific because it is focused solely 
14 Mr. Peters was retained as a witness only to address whether "the allocation and 
apportionment provisions of section 63-3027, Idaho Code, as construed and applied by Cable 
One, fairly represents the extent of its business activity in Idaho and whether Cable One has 
correctly defmed the relevant Income producing activity." Peters Expert Report (Trial Exhibit 
39) at p. 1. Yet as Mr. Peters admitted, he did not undertake any analysis of Cable One's 
revenues and expenses or its profit and loss statements or its depreciation schedules before 
forming his opinions. (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 128, lines 16-21). 
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on Cable One's income earned in the state. Tr. Feb. 27, p. 129, lines 9-18; Peters Expert Report 
(Trial Exhibit 39) at 5; Tr. Feb. 27, p. 123, 1-10 (stating that Mr. Peters solely considered the 
income earned by Cable One in the Idaho "market"); see also Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 577, 
83 P.3d at 121 ("It must also be established that statutory apportionment does not adequately 
reflect business activity, not merely that it does not adequately reflect income earned in the 
state."). 
The crux of Mr. Peters' opinion is that the law is flawed. (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 132, lines 13-
24). When asked whether he was "opining on whether Cable One has interpreted the Idaho State 
tax statute correctly," Mr. Peters conceded "I am not. They may be doing it correctly, they may 
be doing it incorrectly. My argument is that it comes out to a bad result. ... My argument is 
more with the statute than it is than [sic] anything else." !d. The Tax Commission presented no 
other witnesses or evidence to support a finding that Cable One's income as reported did not 
fairly represent its business activity in Idaho for tax year 2005. The testimony of Mr. Peters is 
not adequate to meet the Tax Commission's high "burden of showing that alternative 
apportionment is appropriate." Union Pacific, 139 Idaho at 575, 83 P.3d at 119 (citations 
omitted). 
Cable One's application of the standard three-factor formula is not "unusual" because it 
allows Cable One to exclude some of its sales revenue from the sales factor numerator. Cf Tax 
Commission Br. at 38. Nor does Cable One's approach result in "a zero sales factor." Cf Tax 
Commission Br. at 38. As explained above, Cable One reported ***START 
CONFIDENTIAL*** _ ***END CONFIDENTIAL** in sales revenue for its 
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Idaho sales factor numerator. (Joint Stip. of Exhibits and Facts ~ 17, R. 000282). While Mr. 
Peters would be "embarrassed" to exclude revenues from the sales factor numerator (Tax 
Commission Br. at 38), the exclusion of revenue is the very result contemplated by the statute 
and endorsed by numerous cases in which the taxpayer did exactly that. See I.C. § 63-3027(r); 
see also, e.g., AT&T Massachusetts Board Decision at *14 (where the majority of costs of 
performance were incurred in the state from which a multi state infrastructure was managed, 
court held sales were properly excluded from the sales factor numerator of the market state 
where the customers resided); Michiana, 2012 WL 5854453, at *5 (same). According to I. C. § 
63-3027(r), sales are either deemed "in this state" or not. The result is all or nothing. Cable 
One's determination that some revenue should be excluded from the sales factor numerator 
pursuant to I.C. § 63-3027(r)(2) does not result in a "zero sales factor" and is not an "unusual 
fact situation" automatically triggering alternative apportionment. See Union Pacific, 139 Idaho 
at 576-78, 83 P.3d at 120-22 (identifying an unusual fact situation to be one where the taxpayer 
mixed two accounting systems, which overstated sales). 
C. How Cable One Is Taxed in Other Jurisdictions Does Not Justify Deviation 
from the Strong Presumption in Favor of the Normal Three-Factor 
Apportionment 
How Cable One is taxed in other states makes no difference in determining whether 
Cable One should be subject to an alternative allocation and apportionment in Idaho. Cf Tax 
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Commission Br. at 36. 15 The sole issue here is whether Cable One complied with Idaho law in 
calculating its 2005 income taxes; Cable One's tax liability in Idaho is not based on every other 
state where Cable One does business. Calculation of the sales factor numerator under I.C. § 63-
3027(r) turns solely on costs of performance, not on what revenue was or was not taxed by 
another jurisdiction. I.C. § 63-3027(c)(2). 
While Arizona may have statutes and regulations similar to those found in Idaho (Tax 
Commission Br. at 37), each state interprets its tax laws differently. Gilmour Mfg. Co. v. Com., 
750 A.2d 948, 955 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) ("Gilmour asserts that to effectuate the purposes of 
15 The Tax Commission alleges that "Cable One calls these sales 'Arizona sales' in their 
Idaho return and does not include them; they then take the exact contradictory position and call 
these sales 'Idaho sales' in their Arizona return and do not include them." Tax Commission Br. 
at 4, 7, 36. The Tax Commission's claims are unsupported by the record. Cable One's witness 
testified that Internet access service sales were excluded from its Arizona income tax return 
because "there are interpretations of the statute that depending on the facts and circumstances 
could be different by state" and that Cable One applied the cost of performance approach in 
Arizona as interpreted by Arizona law. Tr. Feb. 25/26, p. 135, line 15 through p. 136, line 10; 
see also Tr. Feb. 25126, p. 145, lines 21-24; p. 147, lines 9-14 (refusing to admit Cable One's 
Arizona tax return into evidence in response to Cable One's relevancy objection that "[w]hat 
Cable One filed in Arizona in 2005 for its income tax purposes is not relevant to the State of 
Idaho"). 
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the UDITP A of uniformity in state taxation laws, the challenged statutory provision should be 
interpreted consistently with those of other states. This argument lacks merit because other 
states have not interpreted similar tax provisions in a uniform way."), aff'd, 822 A.2d 676 (Pa. 
2003). The Tax Commission is not tasked with reviewing Cable One's application of another 
state's tax law. The sole issue in this case is whether Cable One's Idaho income tax liability is 
calculated properly under Idaho law. In Oracle, the Oregon Tax Court rejected the exact 
argument the Tax Commission makes here finding that the characterization of income on 
Oracle's California income tax return could not dictate or control how Oracle's income was to be 
reported in Oregon. Oracle Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2010 WL 496945 (Or. T.e. Feb. 11, 
2010). While the Oracle court noted that UDITPA is "premised on a goal of uniformity" and 
courts have "sanctioned consideration of uniformity," the court found these "aspirational goals 
and 'consideration' of such goals represent matters of policy, not law." Id. at *3 (emphasis in 
original). Accordingly, the Oracle court determined the question of how income is to be 
reported "must be governed by" the law of the state where the return is filed, "not by some 
judicially declared doctrine that may pervert the law in a given situation." Id. at *4; see also id. 
at *3 (rejecting a ruling that "would require the court to become an expert in the laws of 49 other 
states ... not only as set forth in the various states' statutes, but as those statutes are refmed and 
clarified by years of judicial opinions"). 
Similar to the positions taken in the Oracle case, the Tax Commission argues for 
application of alternative apportionment because "uniformity" requires a review of Cable One's 
tax liability in Arizona to ensure a "market approach" is "applied uniformly" and sales are 
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"included as sales in the state where each customer resided." Tax Commission Br. at 36. But 
that is not the law in Idaho. The Idaho Legislature chose to adopt costs of performance instead 
of the "market source" approach that the Tax Commission advocates here. In states that have 
adopted a "market source" law, for example, sales of a service are deemed to be in the state "if 
and to the extent the service is delivered to a location" in the state. See, e.g., Ala. H.B. 434, 2011 
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (2011) (amending Alabama law to move from costs of performance to 
market source). As the Tax Commission's own witness indicated, if the Tax Commission prefers 
the market source approach, it must lobby the Idaho Legislature, not this Court. (Tr. Feb. 27, p. 
132, lines 13-24; p. 135, lines 4-7). The Tax Commission cannot use this case, or how Cable 
One is taxed in Arizona, to advocate a market source approach through application of an 
alternative apportionment. Under Idaho law as it currently stands, Cable One's income tax 
liability was properly calculated and the Tax Commission's speculations about what mayor may 
not have been done in other states are irrelevant. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein and in its Opening Brief, Cable One respectfully submits 
that this Court should reverse the District Court's legal errors and set aside its clearly erroneous 
factual findings, and find that alternative apportionment is not available here as a matter of law, 
holding that Cable One correctly calculated its 2005 Idaho income tax liability. 
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